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BOOK REVIEW 
SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Jim Chen∗ 
From the ashes of global war, creative destruction forged the modern 
world.1 From the heights of global capitalism, destructive creativity threatens 
the postmodern world. The free flow of capital across national borders has 
fueled wealth in all nations. The democratization of capital markets has 
enabled a far larger portion of the world’s population to invest in the global 
economy. At the same time, this expansion in the scale and scope of the 
world’s financial system amplifies the risk at every level, from individual 
investment portfolios to the very integrity of global capitalism. 
A lifetime ago, the victors of the Second World War convened at Bretton 
Woods, New Hampshire, to write new rules for international economic 
engagement in the aftermath of global cataclysm. Mindful that hyperinflation 
and economic collapse had sparked the rise of national socialism and other 
tyrannical ideologies, the international community adopted three formal 
agreements that gave rise to the bedrock organizations of modern international 
economic law: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”)),2 the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”),3 
and the World Bank.4 
These formal institutions of international economic law offered at most a 
modest response to the financial crisis of 2008, the deepest challenge to global 
markets since the Great Depression. A far more decentralized, fragmented set 
of institutions devised ad hoc rules for restoring order to a financial sector 
whose mismanagement of risk in radically democratized and destabilized 
 
 ∗ Dean and Professor of Law, University of Louisville. Special thanks to Heather Elaine Worland Chen. 
I also appreciate help from Robert B. Ahdieh, Christopher French, Gil Grantmore, and Jeffrey Sexton. 
 1 See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81–86 (Harper & 
Bros. Publishers 3d ed. 1950) (discussing the process of creative destruction). 
 2 The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
 3 History, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/about/history.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 
2011). 
 4 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD): Background, WORLD BANK, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTIBRD/0,,contentMDK:21130269~men
uPK:3168298~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3046012,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
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markets had brought the entire world economy to the brink of collapse. In stark 
contrast with the traditional preference for international lawmaking through 
treaties and formal coordination among sovereign nation-states,5 the 
international legal system attempted to stabilize the global financial system 
through a complex web of multinational agencies, standard-setting 
organizations, and the rules devised by those decision-makers. During the 
defining economic disaster of postmodern times, soft law served as first 
responder. 
In Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule-Making in the Twenty-
First Century,6 Christopher J. Brummer provides a detailed and informative 
analysis of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis of 
2008. This accomplishment alone warrants a close look at this book. Yet, 
Professor Brummer goes further in this pivotal work on the law of international 
finance. He provides a persuasive, theoretical account of international financial 
law. Soft Law and the Global Financial System not only describes the 
mechanisms of lawmaking and standard-setting for global financial markets, 
but also delivers a workable framework for prescribing and perhaps even 
perfecting the regulation of the world’s most vital and volatile economic 
institutions. 
Chapter 1 of Soft Law and the Global Financial System examines the 
related phenomena of territoriality and regulatory export in international 
financial law.7 The national law of dominant markets, supplemented by the 
customary practices of those countries’ most influential financial actors, has 
historically supplied many of the rules in international finance.8 By virtue of its 
preeminence in global capital markets, the United States as global hegemon 
has long dictated the terms by which bankers, broker-dealers, and other 
financial intermediaries have moved wealth around the world.9 The global 
crisis of 2008 severely undermined the American claim to economic wisdom 
and political legitimacy. Investors and regulators around the world freely 
assigned ample blame to “American-style free-market capitalism and the idea 
 
 5 See Joshua Kleinfeld, Skeptical Internationalism: A Study of Whether International Law Is Law, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2506–13 (2010). 
 6 CHRISTOPHER J. BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE-MAKING IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (forthcoming Jan. 2012). 
 7 See generally id. (manuscript at 19–50). 
 8 See id. (manuscript at 30–35). 
 9 Id. (manuscript at 24, 29, 36–38, 45). 
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of globalization.”10 Countries that had emulated the American approach to 
financial regulation by “open[ing] themselves to trade and foreign investment 
took an especially tough hit.”11 Meanwhile, countries that were “less 
dependent on cross-border financial flows,” whether by design or by default, 
“weathered the storm.”12 
The global economy reflects the continuing decentralization of 
international financial law. The ongoing crisis of confidence in sovereign debt 
and the European banking industry exposes the European Union’s vulnerability 
to the sort of economic miscalculations that humbled Lehman Brothers and the 
entire American financial sector in 2008.13 Meanwhile, the “BRIC” nations—
Brazil, Russia, India, and China—continue their economic and political 
ascendancy.14 The emerging system of international financial law exhibits 
distinct multipolarity without inescapable polarization.15 Hegemons old and 
new, from the United States and the European Union to BRIC and lesser blocs, 
continue to control financial rules within their borders.16 Even more important, 
the highly decentralized, informal, and market-driven nature of international 
finance enables national regulators to export their rules and norms to receptive 
markets around the world.17 As a result, the makers of international financial 
law routinely share information, engage counterparts, and exhibit a healthy 
inclination to forge policy through compromise rather than conflict.18 
In Chapter 2, Soft Law and the Global Financial System describes the 
architecture of international financial law.19 Professor Brummer details the rise 
of the institutions that promulgate rules, set standards, and enforce compliance 
in international financial law.20 In stark contrast with the WTO, IMF, and 
 
 10 IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR BETWEEN STATES AND 
CORPORATIONS? 178 (2010). 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Editorial, Curing Europe’s Banking Ills, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2011, 11:15 PM), http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/0/f659abb6-edb9-11e0-a9a9-00144feab49a.html; Robert Reich, Editorial, Follow the Money: 
Behind Europe’s Debt Crisis Lurks Another Wall Street Bailout, PBS (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/ 
need-to-know/opinion/follow-the-money-behind-europes-debt-crisis-lurks-another-wall-street-bailout. 
 14 BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 14); Peter Apps, A Decade on, Rise of BRICs Shaped by 
September 11, REUTERS, Sept. 10, 2011, available at http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/ 
idAFJOE7890CN20110910. 
 15 BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 46). 
 16 Id. (manuscript at 14). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. (manuscript at 14, 46). 
 19 Id. (manuscript at 51–95). 
 20 Id. 
CHEN BR GALLEYSFINAL 3/6/2012 11:07 AM 
1564 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25 
World Bank (the troika of international economic organizations tracing their 
origins to Bretton Woods), the agencies of international financial law lack the 
attributes of formal international organizations—institutions created by formal, 
ratified treaties and validated by “state membership, tangible manifestations of 
organizational bureaucracy, and an adequate legal pedigree.”21 The principal 
creators of international financial law fall into four distinct categories: agenda-
setters, sectoral standard-setters, specialists, and international monitors.22 The 
financial ministers and the central bankers of the Group of Twenty Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors (“G-20”) work alongside the newer and 
more technocratic Financial Stability Board in setting the agenda for global 
financial regulation.23 The task of setting international standards for the 
regulation of the banking, securities, and insurance industries falls to the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Organization for 
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”), and the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (“IAIS”).24 The Basel Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS in 
turn coordinate their efforts within the Joint Forum on Financial 
Conglomerates.25 A wide variety of specialized standards emerges from 
organizations such as the International Accounting Standards Board, the 
International Federation of Accountants, the Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems, the Financial Action Task Force, the International 
Association of Deposit Insurers, and the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association.26 Several “hard law” organizations advance these efforts in a 
supporting or monitoring capacity.27 The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development has devised standards for corporate 
governance.28 The Bank for International Settlements not only supplies 
research support to international financial standard-setting organizations, but 
also participates as a private, for-profit provider of reserve management 
services to central banks and other monetary authorities.29 Finally, the IMF and 
the World Bank monitor other regulators’ formal compliance with international 
financial law.30 Together, these heterogeneous entities form a fragmented 
 
 21 David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial 
Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 305 (1998). 
 22 BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 58–78). 
 23 Id. (manuscript at 60). 
 24 Id. (manuscript at 61, 63–64). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. (manuscript at 58–72). 
 27 Id. (manuscript at 73). 
 28 Id. (manuscript at 70–71). 
 29 Id. (manuscript at 73). 
 30 Id. 
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network of structurally independent actors with distinctive sources of authority 
and pathways for legal decision-making.31 
The functional paradox of international financial law lies in the relationship 
between elements of formal, “hard” law and the gradual development and 
enforcement of “soft” law. At an admittedly high level of abstraction, agencies 
of international financial law observe hard law rules as a matter of internal 
operation, but cooperate with each other and with private market actors in an 
informal social network disciplined principally through soft law norms.32 From 
a thorough examination of this phenomenon, Chapter 3 of Soft Law and the 
Global Financial System develops a compliance-based theory of international 
financial law.33 By and large, best practices in contemporary global finance 
have not emerged through positive, prescriptive lawmaking within a single, 
hegemonic nation-state and the de facto export of that nation’s regulatory 
standards to the rest of the world.34 International financial standards are even 
less likely to be developed through a rigid process of formal lawmaking within 
a treaty-based international organization.35 Instead, the decentralized network 
of global financial actors with diverse, broadly distributed responsibilities 
engages in cycles of reciprocity and retaliation as a cooperative method of 
developing international financial law.36 Over the long run, uncooperative, 
self-interested regulators can expect to lose the assistance of other actors 
within the international financial system.37 Countries that fail to follow an 
international regulatory consensus, such as a tightening of risk-based capital 
requirements for banks, jeopardize their financial sector’s access to foreign 
markets.38 Not surprisingly, the enforcement mechanisms of international 
financial law closely resemble the reputational tools that financiers, traders, 
and other private actors routinely use to patrol self-dealing and enforce socially 
 
 31 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 36–64 (2004) (describing international regulation 
as a series of “transgovernmental networks” consisting of executive officials and international organizations). 
 32 BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 55–56). 
 33 Id. (manuscript at 96–141). 
 34 Id. (manuscript at 36). 
 35 Id. (manuscript at 15–16). 
 36 See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 42–48 
(2008). 
 37 See generally id. at 71–117 (discussing the theory of a nation’s reputation). 
 38 See, e.g., DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 60 (2007) (describing how American and British regulators successfully 
persuaded Japan to accept more stringent risk-based capital requirements for banks by making a credible threat 
to exclude Japanese banks from American and British markets). 
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beneficial norms within their own communities.39 The thin shell of hard 
formality in international financial law adds the threat of institutional 
sanctions, such as the denial or withdrawal of membership in an international 
organization, to this arsenal. 
International financial law thus combines legal pronouncements and 
market-based enforcement decisions among financial regulators interacting in 
a global and mostly informal network. The uncomfortable truth is that the 
nodes in this regulatory network are far from equal.40 Chapter 4 of Soft Law 
and the Global Financial System focuses on the arguable crisis of legitimacy 
created by this inequality.41 International financial law demands that its 
enforcers accomplish the formidable political feat of demanding compliance 
within global financial markets while sidestepping democratic accountability 
within domestic and international legal institutions.42 At least within the 
academic imagination, the technocratic nature of formal lawmaking confers an 
advantage in accountability and authoritativeness on “hard” international law.43 
The crafting of formal international law through “justification and persuasion 
in terms of applicable rules and pertinent facts” enforces a sort of evidence-
based discipline on national law and politics.44 Governments that flout 
international law “without a defensible position or without reasonable efforts 
to justify their conduct in legal terms” will “incur reputation costs” for their 
treachery.45 
But those are the very terms by which soft law operates. Professor 
Brummer demonstrates that the conventional dichotomy between hard and soft 
law operates more as a sieve.46 The self-interest of private actors, nation-states, 
and international regulators in reputational goodwill prevails at all points along 
the spectrum between hard and soft law.47 The real source of soft international 
law’s democratic deficit lies in the “dynamic incorporation” of financial 
 
 39 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 123–36 (1991) 
(discussing theoretical aspects of social control); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal 
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (discussing the enforcement 
mechanisms in the diamond industry). 
 40 BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 142). 
 41 Id. (manuscript at 142–65). 
 42 Id. (manuscript at 145, 153). 
 43 Id. (manuscript at 50); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 429 (2000). 
 44 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 43, at 429. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 136–37). 
 47 See id. (manuscript at 101–02). 
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standards adopted by foreign decision-makers into domestic law, with little or 
no opportunity for domestic politicians or regulators to participate at the 
international level.48 Dynamic incorporation without domestic deliberation is 
in practice the norm for the economically weakest players in global financial 
markets, for these are the countries and nongovernmental constituencies least 
likely to participate within the informal, decentralized regulatory framework 
for making international financial law.49 The United States and the European 
Union may have lost some of their economic power over global financial 
markets, but Wall Street, London’s “City,” and the bourses of the Continent 
remain in practice, if not in law, the primary pacesetters for global financial 
traffic.50 
These fears permeate contemporary commentary on international law, and 
they are by no means confined to the financial context.51 In pragmatic if not 
philosophical terms, this purported democratic deficit pales in significance 
alongside the substantive performance of international law in containing global 
financial crises. To answer this question, Soft Law and the Global Financial 
System turns, in Chapter 5, to a close examination of the international financial 
crisis of 2008.52 
“Creativity and risk are inexorably linked.”53 What is true of industrial 
design is likewise true of finance. The global financial crisis of 2008 traces its 
origins to a single country, the United States, and to the unintended 
consequences of mindless mantras embodied in a slogan so closely aligned 
with national character that it was called “the American dream.”54 
Homeownership, as every American schoolchild should now know, does not 
guarantee financial stability. Nor do home values consistently rise. But the 
imprudent extension of subprime mortgages and the aggressive marketing of 
ever more complex and exotic instruments, from mortgage-backed securities to 
collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps, within a globally 
 
 48 See Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 115 (2008). 
 49 See BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 158). 
 50 See, e.g., Mark Scott, The World’s Top Financial Centers, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 5, 2008, 
12:42 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2008/gb2008035_012894.htm. 
 51 See, e.g., Anthony Payne, How Many Gs Are There in ‘Global Governance’ After the Crisis?: The 
Perspectives of the ‘Marginal Majority’ of the World’s States, 86 INT’L AFF. 729, 734–37 (2010) (discussing 
the global governance of trade). 
 52 BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 169). 
 53 Robert N. Jerrard et al., Design, Risk and New Product Development in Five Small Creative 
Companies, INT’L J. DESIGN, Apr. 2008, at 21, 21. 
 54 See BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 169). 
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interconnected financial industry converted the miscalculation of risk within 
one country into a worldwide liquidity crisis.55 The U.S. Senate, with full 
hindsight, recognized that “the crisis was not a natural disaster, but the result of 
high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; and the 
failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in 
the excesses of Wall Street.”56 The free flow of capital across national borders 
thus transmogrified an almost absurdly American problem of overconfidence 
in real estate markets into an economic calamity of global proportions. 
The resulting crisis has drawn a comparably aggressive and creative cycle 
of regulatory responses from national governments and international agencies. 
Chapter 5 of Soft Law and the Global Financial System documents some of the 
most significant legal reactions on the global stage.57 In its effort to repair the 
American credit crisis’ damage to financial institutions around the world, 
international financial law has sought to achieve goals as elusive as they are 
lofty: smooth coordination across national borders, full implementation of 
standards developed through international consensus, and consistently correct, 
risk-reducing regulatory policy.58 At every turn, American and European 
regulators—legal actors in the jurisdictions most deeply affected by the global 
financial crisis—have clashed over the measures that the global financial 
system should adopt.59 The Third Accord of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, better known as Basel III, embodies a hard-fought but arguably 
impotent compromise over risk-weighting and capital requirements for 
banks.60 “Shadow banking” by nontraditional institutions such as hedge funds 
has confounded efforts to identify systemically important financial institutions 
and to combat the moral hazard inherent in an industry dominated by 
participants that are “too big to fail.”61 Overt national disagreements have 
blocked smooth cooperation over issues that are at once technocratic and 
culturally polarizing.62 The International Accounting Standards Board, 
practically speaking, must reconcile the American preference for fair value 
accounting with the contrasting European affinity for historical accounting 
 
 55 See id. (manuscript at 169–70). 
 56 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 1 (Comm. Print 2011). 
 57 See BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 169). 
 58 See id. (manuscript at 187, 191). 
 59 See id. (manuscript at 202–03). 
 60 Id. (manuscript at 187–88, 195). 
 61 Id. (manuscript at 177–79). 
 62 Id. (manuscript at 180–81). 
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coupled with amortization. Limitless executive compensation and naked credit 
default swaps are anathema to Europeans, particularly the French.63 Those very 
features define the cultural landscape of American finance.64 
Cognizant of these barriers to effective international cooperation, Soft Law 
and the Global Financial System concludes with a cautiously hopeful note on 
the future of international financial law. In Chapter 6, Professor Brummer 
rebuffs calls for the creation of a World Finance Organization.65 The sheer 
complexity and scope of cross-border financial transactions, to say nothing of 
the primary actors’ devilish creativity, thwarts the dream of a solution that 
parallels the Bretton Woods institutions and their management of world trade 
and international monetary policy. Instead, international financial law will 
probably proceed on some variation of the existing mechanism for developing 
best regulatory practices through financial diplomacy. The considerable gaps 
left by this international system will provide ample opportunity for 
intervention by national regulators. 
The arc of modern international law, from the Treaty of Westphalia to the 
United Nations Charter and the Bretton Woods trilogy of economic accords, is 
seductive, symmetrical, and beautiful. International law’s attraction to 
formality, elegant and austere, mirrors the financial world’s love affair with the 
Gaussian mathematics that dominates contemporary business and scientific 
cultures.66 In Soft Law and the Global Financial System, Christopher Brummer 
subjects this comforting mirage to the withering realism of adaptive 
lawmaking for global financial markets. In those unruly markets, the only thing 
that rises is correlation.67 The law’s efforts to coordinate markets, 
paradoxically and perversely, amplify financial risks and deepen the scale of 
losses when they accrue.68 The lawyerly preference for ordered liberty quickly 
gives way to the pragmatic acceptance of international financial law as a 
constantly evolving body of regulatory norms that achieve neither economic 
nor democratic completeness. The hope that countries might cooperate 
formally to minimize the risk of another global financial collapse belongs to “a 
 
 63 Id. (manuscript at 202). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. (manuscript at 218–19). 
 66 See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE 277–78 
(2007). 
 67 See, e.g., The New Role of Risk Management: Rebuilding the Model, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (June 
24, 2009), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2268 (“The only thing that rises in falling 
markets is correlations.”). 
 68 See Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 326–27 (2011). 
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system of childish illusions that dominates”69 international law. At the very 
point where “this fact . . . is grasped,” this elementary view of international law 
“like first love . . . passes into memory.”70 In financial affairs, no less than in 
other dimensions of international relations, salvation often lies in nothing more 
tangible than soft power.71 As squalls on the economic horizon signal the next 
global financial collapse, this system of soft international law, at once 
imperfect and unpredictable, promises what may be the worthiest lifeboat in 
the storm. 
 
 69 DAVID BERLINSKI, A TOUR OF THE CALCULUS 239 (1995) (discussing the “hope that antidifferentiation 
might return an elementary function to an elementary function,” a known impossibility in elementary 
mathematics). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See, e.g., JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, at xii (2004) 
(“[S]oft power is essential to winning the peace.”); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Comment, The Decline of America’s 
Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2004, at 16, 16. 
